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Fools, jesters and the possibility of responsible leadership 
 
 
Abstract 
The vibrant academic and practitioner conversation about corporate responsibility does not 
appear to reduce the number of scandals involving unethical managerial behaviour. This 
leaves a question of whether responsible organisational leadership is possible. Some 
leadership scholars recently suggested that understanding leadership as a relational process 
can facilitate more responsible leadership practice. This paper develops the relational 
leadership perspective by offering a critical discussion of the possibility of responsible 
relational leadership. I construct an understanding of responsibility following the writings of 
Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida. I then use the archetypal figure of the Fool as an 
imagination device to translate Levinasian and Derridian ethics into lived experiences and 
thus illuminate the conditions under which responsibility may be possibilised. This theoretical 
analysis exposes the irresolvable tension between responsibility and the relational in 
leadership, rendering responsible leadership unreachable as an end goal. At the same time, it 
suggests that leadership actors can strive for responsibility by engaging with the tension 
between responsibility and the relational, namely through seeking out liminal experiences and 
being open to the dangers associated with both liminality and responsibility. 
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Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to explore the conditions of possibility of responsible leadership. The 
notions of leadership and responsibility and ethics are entwined in academic thought about 
leaders and leadership. When we say ‘leader’, we usually mean someone who, at the very 
minimum, strives to lead her followers to some form of positive achievement (Jackson and 
Parry, 2011; Peters and Austin, 1985). When the leader does not fulfil this expectation, her 
leadership credentials are questioned and a different label is often attached to her – e.g. a 
tyrant, a despot (Kociatkewicz and Kostera, 2012). Researchers also associate unethical 
leadership with negative outcomes for both organisations and followers (Arjoon, 2000; 
Aronson, 2001; De Hoogh and den Hartog, 2008; Sims and Brinkmann, 2002, 2003), and 
some identify particular leadership discourses – for instance, the notion of leadership as 
emanating from an individual who influences others from an autonomous position – as 
ethically deficient (Gemmill and Oakley, 1992; Wray-Bliss, 2013). Either way, ‘the study of 
ethics is fundamental to the study of leadership’ (Ciulla, 2012: 508) and researchers and 
practitioners alike ask what ethical leadership is and how it can be achieved. 
An important feature of the current ethical/responsible leadership literature is a 
diversity of theoretical perspectives. Some focus on leaders’ personal characteristics and 
virtues (e.g. Avolio et al., 2004; Bass and Steidlmeier, 1999; Molyneaux, 2003). Others view 
leadership as a relational process and focus on how leaders may or may not discharge their 
responsibilities to their followers, organisations and other stakeholders (Jones, 2014; Pless 
and Maak, 2011). Yet others critique the discourse of leadership as a function and feature of 
select individuals and promote its understanding as an intersubjective, relational process, as 
constructed and enacted within organisational communities through intersecting meaning, 
knowledge and skill contributions by many organisational members (Cunliffe and Erisken, 
2011; Gronn, 2000; Sutherland et al., 2014). The relational perspectives in particular contain a 
3 
 
powerful promise of more responsible leadership through emphasising the responsibilities of 
leaders to others and pointing out the democratising potential of recognising leadership as a 
communal process.  
In this paper, I specifically seek to contribute to the development of the relational 
leadership perspective. I will understand leadership as ‘occurring in embedded experience and 
relationships’ (Cunliffe and Erisken, 2011: 1429, original emphasis) between many 
‘leadership actors’ or individuals who construct and exercise leadership ‘by managing 
meaning, defining reality and providing a basis for organizational action’ (Sutherland et al., 
2014: 764). While I acknowledge the potential of the relational understanding to promote 
responsible leadership, my key aim is to suggest that the embeddedness of leadership actors 
into relational structures also limits responsible action. More optimistically, I will argue that 
the recognition of this very limitation is precisely what creates the conditions for possibility of 
responsibility in leadership.  
I propose that responsible leadership should be understood as an experience of an 
aporia or a paradoxical situation where contradictory notions seemingly coexist (Derrida, 
1993). This proposition is based on a multi-disciplinary perspective. First, following other 
leadership scholars such as Knights and O’Leary (2006) and Rhodes (2012), I will use the 
writings of Emmanuel Levinas to understand ethics as responsibility to the Other. I will 
supplement this understanding with writings of Jacques Derrida, particularly his The Gift of 
Death that is explicitly devoted to the notion of ethics as responsibility and, in some ways, 
takes the thinking of Levinas further. Specifically, I rely on Derrida’s treatment of aporia as a 
necessary condition for the possibility of responsibility (Derrida, 2008).  
Second, I will use a Jungian psychoanalytic perspective and draw on the archetypal 
figure of the Fool as an imagination device that would allow me to identify the relational 
processes that constitute leadership as a limit of responsibility. Jungian archetypes, as well as 
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myths, legends and literary works in which they feature, have been used by management 
scholars to understand contemporary organisations and contemporary society (e.g. Gabriel, 
2004; Kostera, 2008, 2013) and leadership in particular (Abramson, 2007; Hatch and Kostera, 
2004; Kociatkewicz and Kostera, 2012). I will show the Fool to be a figure who, through the 
combination of liminality, radical creative potential and danger contained in her1, represents a 
partial lived embodiment of Levinasian and Derridian ethics of responsibility. Examining the 
various aspects of this embodiment will allow me to suggest that to strive for responsibility, 
the leadership actor would need to transgress the relational processes and networks that make 
her leadership possible. The dissolution of leadership will, paradoxically, emerge as a 
condition for the possibility of responsible leadership.  
 
Leadership as a relational process 
Literature on ethical and responsible leadership is diverse. One influential perspective sees 
responsible leadership as emanating from a figure of an individual leader. Leaders are said to 
create and sustain ethical and unethical organisational cultures (Grojean et al., 2004; Ofori, 
2009; Sims and Brinkmann, 2003; Wu et al., 2015). A related perspective attempts to define 
the individual features of an ethical leader. A leader’s ethical standing is equated with 
‘authenticity’ or a diverse set of virtues such as altruism, sincerity, honesty, confidence, 
optimism, resilience and a keen awareness of the others’ needs and perspectives (Avolio et 
al., 2004; Bass and Steidlmeier, 1999; also see Ford and Harding, 2011 for a critical review). 
‘Reverence’ – a deep awareness of one’s own limitations – and ‘meekness’ are also suggested 
as pre-conditions for the ethical exercise of power (Molyneaux, 2003; Woodruff, 2001).  
                                                 
1 The Fool is an androgynous figure, capable of being both male and female and of shifting between 
the sexes. While she is most often presented in myths and stories as male, in this paper I will use the 
female pronoun to refer to her to highlight her androgyny and avoid more cumbersome linguistic 
constructions such as “he/she” and “they”. I will employ the male pronoun only when discussing 
specifically male manifestation of the Fool (e.g. the Fool in King Lear).  
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Other leadership ethics researchers explore leadership as a process as opposed to a set 
of individual characteristics and actions. Brown, Trevino and Harrison (2005: 120), for 
instance, define ethical leadership as ‘the demonstration of normatively appropriate conduct’. 
Other organisational members and the broader environment have an input in constructing a 
situational understanding of ethical leadership. This processual and contextualised view is 
linked to the increasingly prominent systemic and relational understandings of leadership that 
challenge the conceptualisation of leadership as an objective feature of individual agency. 
Scholars in this area use a variety of terms – e.g. systemic, distributed, shared, relational, 
collective, emergent, etc. leadership – pursue different agendas and come from different 
disciplines. Some of these perspectives argue that, even when a formal leader is recognised, 
she is discursively constructed and enabled as such by the organisational community. For 
instance, organisational members may reify particular persons in leader roles by projecting 
their own anxieties onto them (Gemmill, 1992; 2002). Writers also observe that leadership is 
a ‘social process’ or ‘group quality’ (Bolden, 2011: 252) with influence, skills and expertise 
distributed, exchanged and pooled within a network of interacting actors (Bennett et al., 2003; 
Gronn, 2000; Spillane and Diamond, 2007). Others attempt to move away from theorising 
based on the leader-follower dynamic and demonstrate the possibility of leadership as 
constructed and exercised through collective and egalitarian meaning-making (e.g. Sutherland 
et al., 2014). While these perspectives are diverse, they are united by a critique of the 
conceptualisation of leadership as a universally intelligible feature of individual agency 
produced by a specific set of individual traits. Leadership is understood as the relational day-
to-day practice ‘whereby “leadership” is conceived of as a collective social process emerging 
through the interaction of multiple actors’ (Bolden, 2011: 251; see also Cunliffe and Eriksen, 
2011; Gronn, 2000; Uhl-Bien, 2006).  
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The relational takes on leadership are sometimes explicitly normative. Some 
researchers advocate the deliberate sharing out of leadership activity within an organisation to 
achieve a variety of organisational outcomes and debate how this can be done (e.g. Harris et 
al., 2007; Wang et al, 2014). Others note the potential of distributed and/or leader-less 
leadership to democratise organisational relationships, bring hidden violence to critical 
attention and support responsible organising (Jones et al., 2016; Pearce et al., 2014; 
Sutherland, Land and Böhm, 2014).  
Some writers within the relational leadership literature encourage conceptualisation of 
leadership as relationship with, responsibility for and accountability to others inside and 
outside the organisation (Cunliffe and Eriksen, 2011; Gabriel, 2014; Rhodes, 2012). Such 
writings often draw on the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas who approached ethics as a 
relational mode of existence and as responsibility to others. Jones (2014) goes as far as to 
define being a leader as being responsible for others (also see Gond et al., 2011; Maak and 
Pless, 2006; Pless and Maak, 2011; Rhodes, 2012; Wray-Bliss, 2013). Knights and O’Leary 
(2006) suggest that the preoccupation with leaders’ characteristics (e.g. leaders’ authenticity) 
may inadvertently reinforce unethical practice. These approaches encourage leaders to focus 
on their own personas as opposed to their relationships with and responsibilities to and for 
others. Knights and O’Leary (2006) offer Levinas’s conceptualisation of ethics as response to 
the Other that is prioritised over the concern about own characteristics and image.  
I will understand leadership as a relational process where leadership is socially 
constructed and performed by a collective of  ‘leadership actors’ within a particular 
organisational context (Sutherland et al., 2014: 764). I will also acknowledge the Levinasian 
strand of the relational leadership literature and its suggestion that the possibility of ethical 
leadership lies in leadership actors prioritising their responsibilities to others. The key 
message, however, will be to reveal a tension between the notions of leadership as produced 
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and performed in a particular relational organisational context and ethical leadership as 
responsibility to others. The rest of the paper is devoted to the exposition of this tension and 
its implications.  
The first sign of this tension is already present in the Levinasian perspective within the 
relational strand of the responsible leadership literature. I use the next section to bring it to the 
forefront of the conceptualisation of responsibility, developing this theme further through the 
ethical writings of Jacques Derrida.  
 
Responsibility as the (im)possible 
The philosophy of Emmanuel Levinasian has been widely used in organisation studies to 
critique the conceptualisations of organisational ethics and responsibility as codifiable, 
subject to management control, and grounded in the logic of rational calculation (Bevan and 
Corvellec, 2007; Pullen and Rhodes, 2015). Such conceptualisations are particularly prevalent 
in the discussions of Corporate Social Responsibility that emphasise creation of codes of 
conduct, social responsibility reporting, measurement of responsibility-related ‘performance’, 
and management oversight and transparency of organisational activities. As the main focus of 
these approaches is not organisational stakeholders but the organisational itself, its image and 
its internal processes, they end up prioritising corporate social legitimacy and enabling self-
serving conduct (Banerjee, 2008; Rhodes, 2016; Roberts, 2003).  
Levinas’s (e.g. 1985a; 1989) understanding of ethics is characterised by the focus on 
the ‘Other’ as opposed to the self and a refusal to create universally applicable guidelines for 
ethical behaviour. Levinas’s task is one of ‘trying to find the meaning of ethics’ (Jones, 2003: 
228), and the meaning is found not in the character of the actor, as in virtue ethics, or in the 
outcomes of an act, as in teleological ethics, or the form of the act, as in deontological ethics, 
but in the moment when the self faces the Other. Ethics for Levinas is foremost about how 
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one relates to others. Jones, Parker and ten Bos (2007) write that others can be used as means 
to particular ends or, at best, treated the same as self, denying them an independent 
subjectivity. Even when the independence and difference of others is acknowledged, it can be 
ignored, meaning it does not cause any corresponding change in the self to accommodate it. 
The ethical for Levinas only becomes possible when others are treated as Others (the capital 
‘O’ denoting their importance), implying an openness to change in oneself to accommodate 
the difference of the Other. Crucially, the response to the Other must not carry an 
expectations of positive return for the self as that would fold the impulse and the action back 
onto the self, reducing the Other to the self (Levinas, 1985b). 
Levinas’s understanding of responsibility contains an aporia. First, as existence is not 
possible without encountering and so occupying intersecting paths with the Other in some 
way; the self is ‘taken hostage’ (Van de Ven, 2005: 8). Responsibility cannot be assumed, it is 
always there, irrespective of one’s actual response to the Other or even the awareness of the 
Others’ existence. The Other can also never be fully known. The alterity of the other does not 
have boundaries and refuses total understanding. It is never fully accessible through the 
sensemaking categories available to the self.  
 
The face is present in its refusal to be contained. In this sense it cannot be 
comprehended, that is, encompassed. It is neither seen nor touched – for in visual or 
tactile sensation the identity of the I envelops the alterity of the object, which becomes 
precisely a content. . . . The face resists possession, resists my powers. (Levinas, 
2011/1961: 194-197).  
 
As the infinite alterity of the Other problematizes the use of own pre-understandings in 
formulating the response, all pre-set conceptions of ethical action (e.g. ethical charters, codes 
of conduct, established norms) fail to amount to responsibility (Levinas, 1978/1997).  
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The impossibility of fully knowing the Other is the source of the constant impasse 
between the impossibility to view the word from the perspective of the Other and the need to 
respond to the demands that are issued from that inaccessible position. An inescapable 
violence towards the Other arises when one has no choice but to respond to the Other from the 
position of reduction (Levinas, 2011/1961). 
The aporia present in Levinas’s responsibility means that responsibility is not a way to 
security that can be derived from a sense of internal coherency and stability and from the 
certainty about the outcomes of one’s actions. In Levinas’s ethics of responsibility, the self is 
constantly undermined and destabilised. The unknowable nature of the Other precludes any 
certainty about the Other’s motivations or the outcomes of responding to his/her calls. Thus, 
responsibility is never finalised.  
In the Gift of Death (2008), Derrida also writes of responsibility as response to the 
Other. Ethics is not about a ‘transcendental objective’ but about ‘the relation to the other’ (p. 
51). The response to the Other also must be a gift, i.e. it must not be based on an expectation 
of reciprocation. Even aiming for a particular outcome for the Other would negate the gift as 
this would involve an assessment conducted from the perspective of the self. A responsible 
decision is thus never a case of simply following rules or weighing the outcomes and always 
involves uncertainty:  
 
…if decision-making is relegated to a knowledge that it is content to follow or to 
develop, then it is no more a responsible decision; it is the technical deployment of a 
cognitive apparatus, the simple mechanistic deployment or a theorem (p. 26).  
 
Absence of concrete reference points and impossibility of relying on existing rules and norms 
injects uncertainty and danger into the exercise of responsibility. One can never be assured 
that her attempts at responsibility will actually amount to responsibility. The certainty of 
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responsibility within responsibility is lacking. Thus, responsibility again is an experience of 
an aporia. However, it is the recognition of the impossibility of responsibility that allows us to 
discern its possibility, however unreachable. ‘An aporia will thus not be synonymous with 
closure but will instead represent a limit through which something announces itself in an 
affirmative fashion’ (Raffoul, 2008: 272).  
Derrida develops the theme of aporia further. As the self and what is known to self 
cannot serve as a knowledge base for decisions about the response to the Other, responsibility 
is always potentially transgressive and diverging from known precepts and norms. Moreover, 
the use of speech threatens responsibility as language is a knowledge system that bends 
subjectivity to the convention of the day, and so its use threatens the reduction of the infinite 
and unknowable Other to the pre-existing understandings. As a result,  
 
The exercise of responsibility seems to leave no choice but this one, however 
uncomfortable it be, of paradox, heresy, and secrecy. More serious still, it must always 
run the risk of conversion and apostasy: there is no responsibility without a dissent and 
inventive rupture with respect to tradition, authority, orthodoxy, rule, or doctrine. (p. 
29)  
 
Further in the Gift of Death, Derrida uses the story of Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac to 
illustrate the experience of such responsibility: Abraham readies himself to sacrifice his 
beloved son Isaac in response to the demand from God – the ultimate unknowable Other. He 
does so silently, without speaking to his community. Paradoxically, in his ethical response to 
God, Abraham breaks accepted ethical norms and becomes a murderer in all but the act:  
 
The ethical can therefore end up making us irresponsible. It is a temptation, a tendency, 
or a facility that would sometimes have to be refused in the name of a responsibility that 
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doesn’t keep account or give an account, neither to man, to humans, to society, to one’s 
fellows, or to one’s own. (p. 62) 
 
Abraham’s responsibility is an embrace of aporia, a ‘leap beyond knowledge’ (Raffoul, 
2008: 285).  
Derrida also connects, although not entirely explicitly, the presence of heresy within 
responsibility with the history of responsibility. He employs Jan Patočka’s differentiation 
between the responsible and the demonic or orgiastic. The demonic/orgiastic is a state of 
undifferentiated consciousness, incapable of distinguishing between the self and Other. 
Responsibility, on the other hand, is born out of self-consciousness and an ability to 
differentiate. ‘A distinction is to be made between the demonic on the other hand (that which 
confuses the limits among the animal, the human, and the divine…) and responsibility on the 
other.’ (p. 4). However, the demonic is not eliminated through the birth of self-consciousness, 
but is merely suppressed and incorporated into it: 
 
Although it is incorporated, disciplined, subjugated and enslaved, the orgiastic is not 
annihilated. . . . The secret of responsibility would consist in keeping secret, or 
“incorporated”, the secret of the demonic, thus protecting within itself a nucleus of 
irresponsibility or of absolute unconsciousness (p. 20-22).  
 
This demonic ‘nucleus of irresponsibility’ contained within responsibility is linked with the 
theme of silence in Derrida’s writing as absence of differentiation can only be experienced 
outside language or other knowledge systems. The demonic makes its existence, however 
suppressed, known through the aporias in responsibility.  
The demonic brings me to the Fool archetype. The Fool is a symbol of 
undifferentiated consciousness and, as a figure that is also aporetic in nature, embodies many 
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(but not all) dimensions of Derrida’s and Levinas’s responsibility. As such, the Fool is an 
appropriate metaphor though which to translate the ethics of Derrida and Levinas into a lived 
experience. I start by very briefly discussing how archetypes serve to translate abstract 
notions into concrete experiences. I then turn to the Fool, examining her features, considering 
how her agency changes when she is embedded within an organisational hierarchy, and 
explaining her embodiment of responsibility. Finally, I bring the strings of the argument 
together by discussing the aporias that the Fool reveals in responsible relational leadership.  
 
Archetypes as sensemaking devices 
In (grossly simplified) Jungian psychology, archetypes are indirect manifestations of 
primordial ideas and abstract themes that constitute the human collective unconscious and 
appear in dreams and myths, manifested in a variety of images (Carr, 2002). Collective 
unconscious is a ‘deeper layer’ of the unconscious that ‘does not derive from personal 
experience … but is inborn [and] more or less the same everywhere and in all individuals’ 
(Jung, 1972: 3-4). It is a universal and innate human biologically determined psychological 
makeup that shapes how people experience the world and themselves in it (Campbell, 1991).  
Archetypes are motifs and images that aggregate the elements of the collective 
unconscious (Jacobi, 1959). They represent basic life experiences such as childhood, 
marriage, maturity, life in society and death, and appear in myths and folk stories that are 
designed to socialise individuals, reconcile them with their own personal journeys through 
time and guide their behaviour and cognition (Campbell, 1991, 1992; Stevens, 1982). While 
the details of archetypal images and stories can be specific to individual societies, their broad 
forms are universal – the Mother, the Wise Old Man, the Hero, the Crone, the Maiden. One of 
their number is the Trickster or the Fool. 
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 There is a small but nonetheless substantial body of research that uses Jung’s writings 
on archetypes to study organisational life (Czarniawska-Joerges and Wolff, 1991; Denhardt, 
1981; Mitroff, 1983, a, b; Mrotek, 2001). Particularly prominent over the last few decades is 
the work of Martin Bowles, Paul Moxnes, Monika Kostera and Jerzy Kociatkewicz. Bowles 
(1990, 1993, 1994, 1997) refers to archetypes as part of the ‘deep structures’ (1990: 460) of 
the collective human psyche that inform activity and understanding within organisations. 
Individuals enact particular archetypal roles or interpret organisational activity using 
archetypal images such as marriage and war. As archetypes possess both positive and 
negative aspects (e.g. Wise Old Woman – Evil Witch), using them as analytical frames helps 
achieve a more complex and multi-faceted understanding of organisational roles and 
activities. Paul Moxnes develops the ‘deep role’ perspective that uses archetypes and myths to 
explore group dynamics (1999a, 1999b, 2013) and organisational outcomes (Moxnes and 
Moxnes, 2016). Kociatkiewicz and Kostera (e.g. 2010; 2015, also see Ciuk and Kostera, 
2010) used abstract archetypal images such as the oblivion, the labyrinth and the shadow to 
uncover complexities in organisational identities and experiences. Kostera (2008: 1) argues 
archetypes ‘can help us see and understand many important phenomena that are invisible to 
the rational instrumental mind’. They reveal hidden aspects of self and the environment, 
translate abstract concepts into more concrete experiences, and galvanise the imagination 
(Hart and Brady, 2005; Kociatkewicz and Kostera, 2012).  
Archetypal images – e.g. the King or the Hero – have been used to study 
organisational leadership actors (Ford, Harding and Learmonth, 2008; Kociatkewicz and 
Kostera, 2012). A Hero is particularly tempting as a metaphor for ethics. However, a Hero, 
although often capable of doing good, mainly reflects and supports rather than transgresses 
the existing social order. He may kill the dragon and defeat the usurper, but he does not as a 
rule challenge the fundamental social structures. The heroic trials are thus often interpreted as 
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teaching a person how to deal with immature aspects of the self and find a proper place in the 
world (Campbell, 1993). As a consequence, I suggest that the Hero may not be the best 
metaphor for responsibility that implies transgressing prevailing practices. As Derrida (2008: 
79) remarks about Abraham: ‘Whereas the tragic hero is great, admired, and legendary from 
generation to generation, Abraham, in remaining faithful to this singular love for the wholly 
other, is never considered a hero.’ Instead, I suggest that it is the Fool who best embodies 
Levinasian and Derridian responsibility.  
 
Responsibility in Fools 
The Fool, the Trickster, the Jester, the Joker, the Clown are all associated archetypal images 
(e.g. Dionigi, 2016; Harris, 2012; Nichols, 1974). Each possesses peculiar features, such as 
the Trickster’s inclination towards deceit2 and the Jester’s towards the critique of power. All, 
however, have a degree of foolishness or affect, cognition and behaviour that is not 
considered logical or meaningful in a socially accepted sense. For instance, Jung (1969) 
labelled his archetype the ‘Trickster’3, but endowed her with undoubtedly foolish 
characteristics: he describes the Trickster as a ‘simpleton’ who is regularly ‘fooled’ (p. 255). I 
focus on the figure of the Fool specifically because foolishness (or unconventional rationality) 
is a common denominator for a collection of characters – Tricksters, Jesters, Clowns and 
Thieves – whose role is to challenge the existing idea of normality.  
On one hand, there are significant divergences between the Fool and my 
understanding of responsibility. The Fool is an ‘archetypal psychic structure of extreme 
antiquity’ that represents ‘an absolutely undifferentiated human consciousness’ (Jung, 1969: 
260). As an undifferentiated being, she is not cognisant of cause and effect, self and other, 
                                                 
2 The Trickster is also associated with the character of the Thief (Brown, 1990). 
3 It is possible that Jung chose the ‘Trickster’ label because his major source for the discussion of this 
archetypal figure was Paul Radin’s account of the Winnebago stories that involve a trickster 
character (e.g. Radin, 1976/1956).  
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light and dark, male and female; she cannot distinguish good from evil, or even herself from 
her environment. She often does not care about the consequences of her own actions. The 
undifferentiated nature makes the Fool the personification of Patočka’s demonic and is in 
conflict with Levinas’s and Derrida’s responsibility that is experienced as a differentiation 
between self and Other and also as internal strife (Derridad, 2008; Levinas, 1985a). While the 
responsible person is focused on the needs of the Other, the Fool is often motivated by her 
own amusement.   
On the other hand, it is precisely the Fool’s undifferentiated character and her not 
being tied into any particular knowledge system that allows her to accomplish much that can 
be called responsible. It is difficult to ignore that in numerous tales the Fool ‘manages to 
achieve through his stupidity what others fail to accomplish through their best efforts’ (Jung, 
1969: 255). She is the source of exuberant creativity that benefits others around her. In Hindu 
mythology, trickster god Shiva is a creator and transformer of the world. Norse trickster Loki 
spends much of his time assisting the gods, including by extracting valuable treasures from 
the dwarves for the gods (von Schnurbein, 2000). North American trickster Wakdjunkaga 
protects people from monsters and provides them with valuable tools (Babcock-Abrahams, 
1975).  
Fool’s creativity is a result of her undifferentiated and transgressive nature. As a pre-
conscious being, the Fool is not governed by social norms. Her disregard for convention 
allows her to attain unexpected and illuminating insights. The Fool- and Trickster-type folk 
tale characters – such as Nasreddin Hodja – are thus often associated with unconventional 
wisdom (Kostera, 2012). Robin Hood provides protection for the dispossessed and fights 
against oppressive social order (Kostera, 2012). Court Jesters and Clowns speak unpalatable 
truths to kings and hold up mirrors to society’s shortcomings through ridicule and the 
grotesque (Amoore and Hall, 2013; Otto, 2001). Nonsensical riddles are used in some 
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Buddhist practices to induce revelations, and mental illness sufferers as seen as Holy Fools 
close to god in some Christian traditions (Phan, 2001). Arrangements of unmanaged contexts 
termed ‘technology of foolishness’ have been seen by some as a way to promote creativity in 
organisation (Izak, 2013: 87).   
The link between the Fool’s transgressive nature and her productive creativity is in 
strong congruence with the responsibility ethics of Levinas and Derrida that cannot be 
exercised by following convention. As responsibility is about engagement with the infinite 
alterity of the Other that leads to unchartered territories, the Fool’s creativity stems from her 
freedom to question, to ridicule and to abandon established norms. Her undifferentiated nature 
allows her to see past the existing meaning categories to alternative realities where the 
liberation of the oppressed and the overturning of injustice may be possible.  
The Fool also personifies the fluid self that is a consequence of being prepared to 
answer the call of the Other. In the tales, she a habitual shape-shifter, assuming the forms of 
different animals and moving with ease between sexes (Babcock-Abrahams, 1975). She lacks 
a stable position in the world. In a Tarot deck, the Fool is the only card without an assigned 
place within the card hierarchy. Fools and Tricksters are associated with liminal spaces such 
as crossroads and marketplaces and often violate spatial and temporal boundaries by being 
active at night, living in secluded caves or wondering the world (Babcock-Abrahams, 1975). 
The world of the Fool is continuously shifting. Similarly, responsibility is about constant 
readiness to change oneself in response to the Other. To act responsibly, one cannot hold onto 
a constant identity or a reified understanding of the world.  
Another strong theme in the Fool’s character is danger.  Her exuberant creativity 
appears alongside destructiveness (Russo, 2008). Her infantile and unsocialised nature renders 
her potentially very destructive, and some authors interpret the Fool primarily as a source of 
danger (e.g. Horvath, 2008). For instance, Loki stands against the gods in the final battle of 
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the end of world (von Schnurbein, 2000). Wakdjunkaga desecrates sacred tribal offices and 
commits acts of mindless cruelty (Babcock-Abrahams, 1975). Shiva, in addition to being the 
creator, is also the destroyer.  
Fool’s destructiveness is a poignant illustration of Derrida’s assertion that striving for 
responsibility also opens one up to irresponsibility. Responding to the Other without being 
able to forecast the outcomes (or playing without aim), abandoning attempts at controlling 
own position, identity and future (or shape-shifting) is dangerous. The Fool demonstrates the 
full extent of possible destruction, down to death and the end of the known world.  
 
Place Figure 1 about here 
 
Importantly, the two aspects of the Fool described here – destructiveness and 
creativity – are not discreet. Both are consequences of her undifferentiated character, and one 
does not exist without the other. A potent portrayal of this enmeshment of good and evil and 
the resulting ambiguity is the Fool’s representation in the Tarot card decks. The Rider-Waite 
Tarot deck shows her (Figure 1) as a dreamy young man who is not looking at the path he 
walks and is about to step over a precipice. However, the sun of divine wisdom is shown to 
shine on him behind his back and in his hand he holds a rose – a symbol of divine insight. 
These symbols indicate that the step off the precipice may not lead to his destruction but 
result in some other consequence that cannot be revealed through conventional understanding 
(Nichols, 1980).  
It is also the Fool’s liminal existence in the boundary spaces that generates her 
creative insight. She does not belong to society, is not held down by established knowledge 
systems and thus has the opportunity to view them from the outside and challenge them. This 
parallels the theme of silence and secrecy in Derrida’s ethics.  The Fool possesses a certain 
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loneliness, she stands apart, just as Abraham is alone in his decision to obey god’s command.  
Having established a connection between the responsibility and the Fool, I now turn to 
King Lear for the brief exploration of a Fool in a hierarchical organisational context and 
finally to the discussion of how the Fool helps conceptualise and advance the possibility of 
responsible leadership.  
 
The Fool within a hierarchy  
The literature on how works of fiction reflect, legitimise and interpret organisational and 
economic realities is well established (De Cock and Land, 2006).  Fiction has been a source of 
ideas and interpretations that, when transposed onto accounts of organisational and social 
phenomena, can be used to achieve their more complex and critical understandings (Land and 
Śliwa, 2009; Matanle, McCann and Ashmore, 2008; Śliwa and Cairns, 2007), educate 
managers (Czarniawska-Joerges and de Monthoux, 1994; Martin, Edwards and Sayers, 2018) 
and imagine alternative organisational futures (Land and Corbett, 2003; McCabe, 2013; Pick, 
2017). I will use Shakespeare’s King Lear to develop an understanding of how the Fool, in 
the incarnation of a Court Jester, may function within a social hierarchy (Czarniawska-
Joerges and Wolff, 1991). King Lear, as a great work of literature, possesses complexity 
necessary to portray the Jester as a character who is as rich and multi-dimensional as her 
mythical counterpart. It is also a work familiar to many, so I may be excused for only 
providing a brief summary of the plot4 (please see footnote four, I used the 1963 Signet 
                                                 
4 Having reached an advanced age and wanting to lay down his burdens, King Lear decides to divide 
his kingdom between this three daughters. He declares that he will award the biggest portion to the 
one who loves him the most. Two older daughters, Goneril and Regan, are eloquent in flattering their 
father and so receive their share. The third, Cordelia, although she loves her father dearly, refuses to 
participate in the farce and is banished. She weds the king of France and leaves Britain. Once Lear 
abdicates, Goneril and Regan refuse to uphold their promise to maintain their father and his retinue 
in their households. The dispossessed Lear ends up wondering the wilderness accompanied by his 
Fool, increasingly sliding into madness, but helped by two loyal subjects who assist him in disguise. 
Conflicts develop between Goneril and Regan while Cordelia lands in Britain with a French army, 
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Classic edition).  
The message of King Lear in regards to the Fool is that in the officially sanctioned 
character of the Court Jester the Fool loses much of her generative power. At the first glance, 
the Jester’s position of a critical voice sanctioned by authority is what gives him the 
opportunity to exercise his ethical function. The Fool is the only person in the story who can 
speak the truth to Lear with relative impunity. All other individuals loyal to Lear either have 
to aid the king indirectly, under the cover of false identities, or are banished like Cordelia. 
Only the Fool accompanies the king under his true identity (if a Fool can be said to have one), 
and openly criticises the king’s decisions. 
Lear’s Fool also continues the theme of being set apart, which he is in both language 
and dress. His council to the king does not consist of direct and rational explanations. Instead, 
it comes in the form of jokes, verses and riddles that can be interpreted in more than one way 
and thus give the other characters in the play and the audience an opportunity to meditate and 
consider a variety of angles and implications.  
Ultimately, however, the Fool is powerless to change Lear’s course and save him from 
destruction. This arguably happens because, as the Court Jester, he ceases to be an 
independently functioning being and his influence is always conditioned by his relationship to 
the king. He exists under the king’s protection. His riddles and motley may set him apart, but 
they are also his only means of speaking to power. He becomes fixed in these characteristics. 
He can offer critique, but only while existing within the boundaries of the court, much as the 
                                                                                                                                                        
intending to invade and possibly restore Lear to his throne. The French side loses the ensuing battle 
and Cordelia and Lear are captured. Cordelia is executed despite the fact that the quarrels between 
Goneril and Regan also result in their deaths. Lear dies of exhaustion and grief. The Fool 
accompanies Lear throughout the story, intermittently criticising his decisions, pitying him, offering 
a commentary on the events and providing a degree of support, but always remaining subservient. At 
the end, the Fool perishes together with Lear, but the circumstances of his death/disappearance are 
not clear.   
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carnival clowns may mock authority only at designated times of the year. The Jester has little 
power to act but through the king. When embedded into a social hierarchy, the Fool gains a 
captive audience but loses the power to act upon the world. The dependence of the Fool on 
the king is underscored when the Fool apparently5 meets his death as Lear rapidly approaches 
his own. 
 
Fools and the possibility of responsible leadership 
What lessons can we derive from the figure of the Fool about the possibility of responsibility 
in leadership? The Fool exposes the tension between the notion of leadership as constituted 
through a network of organisational relationships and the notion of responsible leadership 
defined through the focus on the needs of Others. The potential of responsible relational 
leadership is problematic precisely because of its relational nature.  
 As a partial embodiment of Levinasian and Derridian ethics, the Fool concretises the 
meaning of Derrida’s argument that an ethical decision is not possible if it is grounded in an 
existing and accepted knowledge (Derrida, 2008: 26). Scholars of Levinasian and Derridian 
ethics (e.g. Bevan and Corvellec, 2007; Painter-Morland, 2010) already note that 
organisational tools such as codes of conduct constitute such existing knowledges that 
threaten the possibility of an ethical decision. The Fool adds to this line of thinking by 
demonstrating that not only specific management tools but also the organisational relational 
structures form the knowledge systems that can limit the ethical imagination and the 
possibility of a response to the Other that is not framed around the self. The Fool exercises her 
                                                 
5 In the last act of the play, after Cordelia is treacherously killed, Lear exclaims, ‘And my poor fool is 
hanged’. The word ‘fool’ can be interpreted in two ways, the first being a term of endearment used 
by Lear to refer to his daughter. The second possibility refers to the Fool himself, who disappears 
from the scene some time before and does not enter the play again. It has been suggested (e.g. Stroup 
1961) that both Cordelia and the Fool were originally supposed to be played by the same actor, as 
was a common practice in Shakespeare’s times. Thus, Lear’s enigmatic utterance could be a game of 
words that refers to this fact, as well as to the spiritual affinity between Cordelia and the Fool.  
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creativity while always being set apart from the rest of society. It is by standing outside 
dominant knowledge systems that she has the power to critique them and put forward new 
perspectives. When she does acquire an official place in society (e.g. as a Court Jester), her 
power to critique and to effect change diminishes. 
 Being ‘set apart’, however, is not possible in relational leadership that is constituted 
by particular organisational relational systems (Maak, 2007). Even when leadership is not 
conceptualised from a relational perspective, it can be difficult to talk about leaders as 
standing outside the relational organisational structures. For instance, Ford and Harding 
(2011) provide a powerful argument that even ‘authentic’ leaders who are defined in 
leadership literature as committed to their own internal set of values in practice are expected 
to align these internal values with organisational objectives. Therefore, the possibility of 
responding to the Other, inside or outside the organisation, from the position of standing apart 
is limited in the context of leadership and relational leadership in particular. Being a part of 
such self-referential system limits opportunities for transgressing the internal logic of the 
system, as the Court Jester demonstrates. The Fool exposes the tension within responsible 
leadership – that it simultaneously involves embeddedness in a system of relations and 
requires standing outside that system in order to be able to critique it. 
The Fool also points to the conventional language as a knowledge that may limit the 
possibility of responsibility. Derrida associates responsibility with silence. Silence is a way of 
‘standing apart’ as it allows one to escape the knowledge systems constituted by language and 
formulate a response to the Other that may have been impossible to contemplate from within 
the meaning schemas made available by a certain language. The Fool, particularly in the form 
of the Court Jester engages in similar linguistic escapes, but expands their possible forms 
beyond silence – e.g. to riddles, jokes, rhyming speech. This non-conventional speech is what 
literally gives the Jester the critical voice; it is a vehicle of critique. The Fool’s use of speech, 
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albeit in a modified form, offers a possibility of avoiding a complete silence and thus 
separation from one’s community, but the one that still forces creative thinking.     
Current writings on relational leadership, however, are at odds with silence and non-
conventional speech as they tend to emphasise the importance of effective and sustained 
communication within relational networks (e.g. Seeger and Ulmer, 2003; Sutherland, Land 
and Böhm, 2014; Uhl-Bien, 2006). Other leadership scholars associate transparency with 
responsibility (e.g. De Hoogh and Den Hartog, 2008). Leadership actors are encouraged to be 
transparent in their actions and communication with their stakeholders. They are invited to 
engage in ‘clarification of expectations and responsibilities so that employees are clear on 
what is expected from them’ (De Hoogh and Den Hartog, 2008: 298). This is at odds with 
responsibility as the use of an accepted and shared discourse grounds the leadership actor in a 
particular set of values and assumptions, precluding a radical critique of those assumptions 
and the openness to the alterity of the Other.  
While individuals in organisation can attempt the adoption of non-conventional speech 
– e.g. Bevan and Corvellec (2007) advocate that managers adopt a language of submission, 
service and empathy as opposed to the traditional managerial discourse of efficiency and 
control – it is fraught with difficulties. The nascent literature on the work of corporate 
responsibility or sustainability managers exposes such frustrations. The researchers in this 
area pointed out that while responsibility managers may desire to use the language aligned 
with Bevan and Corvellec’s (2007) recommendations to respond to their stakeholders, they 
are regularly forced to adopt the language of business cost minimisation, profit margins, 
growth and other commercial concerns to gain legitimacy within their organisations (Visser 
and Crane 2010; Wright, Nyberg and Grant 2012). A manager who refuses to accept the 
conventional language in an attempt at responsible leadership may well deny himself/herself 
organisational legitimacy and the leadership role. Ultimately, a limited discursive repertoire 
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focused on organisational survival forecloses wide-reaching critical and creative reflection. 
For instance, a responsibility manager’s job can be focused on maintaining order by 
controlling for ‘non-financial’ reputational risks as opposed to uncovering the violence of 
existing organisational practices.  
In addition to uncovering the tension between the notions of relational and responsible 
leadership, the Fool challenges the understanding of responsible leadership as an endeavour 
that delivers positive outcomes. Levinas’s and Derrida’s understanding of responsibility 
precludes certainty about the nature of the outcomes of the response. It also preludes any 
expectation of a return, positive or otherwise. Responsibility is inherently dangerous as it 
involves making decision on a basis of incomplete information. The Fool demonstrates the 
possible extent of the danger and its enmeshment with creative vision. Her creativity is 
grounded in destruction of existing norms, the undermining of the existing order and the 
absence of a coherent self. The Fool reveals that creativity and destruction are not just two 
sides of the same coin between which one could choose, but are enmeshed, with one arising 
out of the other.  
Thus, understanding responsible leadership as a purely positively productive activity 
is problematic. Some authors already note that individuals in leadership positions experience 
leadership as an anxiety-filled process (e.g. Ford, 2010; Parker, 2004). Striving for 
responsibility may also not generate positive returns for an individual or an organisation but, 
on the contrary, mean reduced profits accompanied by the discomfort of organisational 
change for organisational members. For instance, organisations regularly find responding to 
the demands of their stakeholders costly when their competitors do not follow suit and such 
responsiveness has not yet become a norm or, in Derrida’s view has not yet transitioned to 
being non-ethical (Zadek, 2004). Responsibility is dangerous and it becomes safe only when 
it becomes a norm, in other words, when it ceases to be responsibility. It is conditioned upon 
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openness to destructive change. Nonetheless, it is important to note that unlike the story of 
Abraham, the Fool explicitly offers hope as her activities are not always destructive but often 
result in positive gains.  
To summarise, the Fool archetype embodies many features of Levinas’s and Derrida’s 
responsibility and reveals responsible leadership as a problematic notion by shedding light on 
the aporia situated in it. While leadership is relational, responsibility can only be approached 
through stepping outside relational structures and language systems that sustain them, 
potentially severing relationship ties that make up the leadership. The danger and uncertainty 
involved in the exercise of responsibility also mean that responsible leadership can be 
attempted only through openness to irresponsibility.  
 
Responsible leadership as experience of aporia 
In this section, I discuss the possible productive implications of the aporia where responsible 
leadership is characterised by a lack of both leadership and responsibility. Derrida suggest 
viewing the aporia not as a limit at which the possibility of something stops to the extent that 
it should not be attempted, but as a limit to see through. The act of seeing through the limit is 
an act of imagination where the impossible is imagined and thus given the power to shape 
thoughts and actions. Recognition of an aporia is a moment of rupture where the impossible is 
glimpsed through the limit and is possibilised: 
 
Derrida … urges us to think on the impossible, and notes that ‘[t]o do the impossible 
cannot be an ethics and yet it is the condition of ethics. I try to think the possibility of the 
impossible.’ For Derrida, ‘possibility’ and ‘impossibility’ are not modal opposites’ rather, 
the impossibility of ethics serves as the condition for its very possibility. (Woermann, 
2013: 67) 
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Aporia of responsible leadership is not to be ignored or suppressed but embraced. ‘We must 
act, even though our actions are imperfect’ (Woermann, 2013: 121). Responsibility should be 
attempted even with the knowledge that it cannot be fully accomplished. The aporia is not a 
limit at which to stop. Instead, leadership actors should cultivate awareness of and learn to 
think ‘according to the aporia’ (Raffoul, 2008: 272).  
The Fool’s characteristics illuminating the impossibility of responsible leadership also 
indicate where and how leadership actors can seek out opportunities to partially disengage 
themselves from the knowledge systems in which we are embedded. Such disengagement will 
allow them to experience different perspectives, critically reflect upon own knowledge 
systems, and envisage change. The Fool shows that opportunities for partial disengagement 
can be found in a variety of liminal situations. Liminality is an ambiguous state of being ‘in 
between’: between social roles, between spaces with a clear designated function, or at the 
margins of established social structures (Garsten, 1999; Tempest and Starkey, 2004) The Fool 
is able to exercise most of her creative powers when existing in liminal spaces – not separated 
but not integrated into the society either – on the boundaries, crossroads, marketplaces. Her 
transgressive capacity is associated with a lack of differentiation or a defined and stable 
identity. Her creativity is also expressed through play, including playful speech – a liminal ‘as 
if’ activity (Statler et al., 2009). Once the Fool acquires a defined place and identity within a 
social hierarchy, she struggles to effect change.   
Similarly, some management scholars identify liminality with opportunities for 
acquiring novel perspectives, enhancing creativity and challenging established norms. Spaces 
without clearly designated functions on the margins of workplaces such as corridors, 
basements, storage rooms, back rooms, etc. offer employees the chance temporarily and at 
least partially to escape the management gaze, speak more freely and plot challenges to 
established organisational practices (Courpasson et al., 2017; Shortt, 2015). Liminality 
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characterises temporary, transitional or marginal roles such as employees on temporary 
contracts, freelancers or consultants (Czarniawska and Mazza, 2003; Sturdy et al., 2006; 
Tempest and Starkey, 2004). Gemmill and Oakley (1992) go as far as call consultants ‘sage-
fools’ (p. 122). Authors note that liminal roles facilitate experimenting with a variety of new 
behaviours, ‘heightened noticing’ of diverse and new meanings, and self-questioning and 
self-change (Beech, 2011: 289; Tempest and Starkey, 2004). Finally, play opens up 
opportunities to imagine and try out different roles, identities, meanings and situations. 
Through play, established beliefs can be de-naturalised, suspended, displaced, and examined 
anew (Conroy, 2004; Izak, 2014; Mainemelis and Ronson, 2006; Statler et al., 2009). 
Liminality can be a way to act according to the aporia of responsible leadership 
precisely because it does not involve a complete break with established social systems, but 
only the stepping onto the margin or the space ‘in between’. It is a partial disengagement from 
current relational structures that creates a critical distance and lets in experiences of the Other 
while maintaining some links with the old. An encounter with the Other can be attempted 
without the complete dissolution of the leadership role. Liminal experiences could be sought 
out through engaging with stakeholders who are not normally part of the organisational circle, 
participating in events that may not have a direct relevance to the bottom line, purposefully 
cultivating doubt about the desirability of current practices, temporarily shape-shifting by 
relinquishing leadership roles or trying out different roles within the relational network, and 
using unconventional speech.  The search for authenticity, on the contrary, as an attempt to 
reify oneself in a set of well-defined virtues, stands in opposition to liminality and therefore 
emerges as contradictory to responsibility. Hawkins and Edwards (2013) see doubt as 
generative and treat leaders who doubt their own authenticity as examples of strong 
leadership. Weick (2012: 263) argues that good leadership often emanates from ‘dropping the 
heavy tools of logic and rationality’. 
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It should not be forgotten, however, that liminality is laced with dangers. One may 
become lost without the guidance of stable values. The Fool emphasises the necessity to 
accept the potentially destructive side of liminality, not least through the powerful image of 
the precipice. Negotiating a diversity of social boundaries and the contradictions of different 
meanings can be unsettling and painful (Sturdy et al., 2006). Beech (2011) argues that 
prolonged existence in a liminal state may lead to feelings of anxiety, vulnerability, loss of 
identity and social isolation. Parker (2004) provides an illuminating account of anxieties 
experienced by someone who continuously asks questions as opposed to attempting to ground 
himself/herself in certainties. The Fool, however, and her connection to destruction in the 
broadest sense (e.g. Loki’s role in the end of the world) illuminates the danger of liminality 
that goes beyond individual negative outcomes and potentially concerns the effects on broader 
social structures such as organisations.  
Embracing aporia of responsible leadership also means accepting the blurring of the of 
the ‘leader’ and ‘leadership’ as concepts that denote a particular positions or activities. The 
closer I try to focus the attention on the ‘responsibility’ part of ‘responsible leadership’ the 
less meaningful and tangible the ‘leadership’ part becomes.  Leadership dissolves in the 
movement towards responsibility. As individuals seek out liminal contexts where they may 
enhance their potential for creative insight and find less reductionist positions from which to 
respond to the Other, they may have to abandon the relationship structures that enable the 
exercise of their leadership. This thread of thought provides support to the critical writings 
that see leader identity as an unattainable goal and organisational members having fluid rather 
than fixed identities that constantly flow between leader and follower subject positions (e.g. 
Ford, 2006; Ford et al., 2008; Nyberg and Sveningsson, 2014). It also connects with Gemmill 
and Oakley’s (1992) argument that leaders are socially constructed expressions of the 
organisational members’ desire to control their environment and thus avoid feelings of 
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anxiety. Leadership is compromised upon stepping outside relational networks and engaging 
anxieties in liminal situations.  
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I aimed to interrogate the conditions of possibility of responsible relational 
leadership. I defined responsibility using the philosophical perspectives of Emanuel Levinas 
and Jacques Derrida and then used the archetypal figure of the Fool as a sensemaking device 
to consider under what conditions responsible leadership may be possible. The Fool allowed 
me to illuminate responsible relational leadership as an aporia and showed that relational 
nature of responsible leaderships, while defining it, also presents the key barrier to its 
realisation. The Fool who contains a possibility of responsibility attains this possibility by 
walking close to the precipice and occasionally falling off it. Responsibility is conditioned by 
the readiness to transgress the present norms and values and, without expecting anything in 
return, answer the call of the Other who can never be fully known. It is possible for the Fool 
as her nature sets her at least partially apart from any particular system of relationships or 
knowledge. Organisational leadership, however, is constituted by embeddedness in networks 
of relationships and knowledge systems which are difficult to transgress from the inside.  
However, I also suggested that this aporia should not be treated as a limit where one’s 
journey stops, but as a limit to look beyond, and, through the act of looking, to imagine things 
different to the current situation. Responsibility may be attempted through seeking out liminal 
situations that would allow partial disengagement from the relational structures that constitute 
leadership. Embracing aporia also means acceptance of unintended negative outcomes that is 
involved in stepping out into the unknown. However, the Fool also offers hope as her 
transgressions often result in good.  
The Fool in both mythology and literature provides an important point of invention 
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through which we might imagine conditions under which responsibility can be enacted. She 
draws attention to the liminality of the ethical moment and the reliance organisational 
members must place on the possibility of evil in their aspiration towards the good. The Fool 
reminds us of the impossibility and impracticality of achieving the perfection of ethical 
leadership and so provides the necessary space of indecision and the dangerous play through 
which new ethical possibilities for decision and action might emerge. The exposition of the 
irresolvable tension between ethics and leadership is particularly important in the 
contemporary anxiety-inducing environment where corporate ethical violations hit the 
headlines every day and where the temptation to relieve the anxiety through constructing 
‘responsible leaders’ may be great (Gemmill, 2002).  
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Figure 1: The Fool card in the Rider-Waite tarot deck 
 
